ABSTRACT The co-tier and cross-tier interferences become serious when the electric power communication networks are deployed densely in the coverage area of the primary network base station (PBS). To reduce the co-tier interference in the electric power communication networks and guarantee the quality of service of the primary networks users (PUEs), we propose a distributed power control method. First, a reasonable interference threshold of the PBS is chosen to guarantee the PUE's transmission requirement. Then, a fictitious power-price game with interference compensation is employed to update the power of gateways in smart grid on the condition of the interference threshold. Finally, a modified distributed power control method is proposed to protect the primary network link. Simulation results show that the co-tier interference among gateways is reduced efficiently, the target signal-to-interference plus noise ratio of the PUEs can be achieved, and the network performance is improved.
I. INTRODUCTION
The decentralized nature of smart grids requires two-way communications between the the utility company and consumers, such as advanced smart metering [1] . In smart grid, regulation can continuously balance generation and load under normal conditions [2] . On the whole, the regulation service is based on the automatic generation control (AGC) which can be offered by on-line generation. Since the utility company purchases the AGC service when the generation and loads mismatch, the cost of the utility company are increased with the errors. Callaway [3] have proved that the errors can be reduced by demand-side regulation. Demand response is proposed to provide regulation service under normal conditions. The control of flexible loads such as air conditions are proposed to provide regulation service due to low cost and fast ramp rate [4] . The regulation in smart grid is based on an advanced metering infrastructure (AMI) [5] , [6] , including home area networks (HAN), neighborhood area networks (NAN), and wide area networks (WAN). In the AMI, a data aggregator unit (DAU) is deployed to forward the data between the utility company and consumers. The demand-side management cost is dependent on the quality of the communications in the AMI [7] . Niyato et al. [8] - [10] considered congestions at the DAU due to the synchronized transmission of large volumes of data, hence it would generate the packets loss and the response errors, consequently increased the costs of the utility company. The results suggested that the estimated demand followed normal distribution and the response errors were increased with the packets loss rate. Zheng et al. [11] , [12] denoted the packets loss caused by the errors between the utility company and the consumers. In the electric power communication network, if the receiving rates of the gateways are greater, the packets loss will be lower during the data transmission, thus it is necessary that the DAU needs to improve the transmission rate to increase the receiving rates of the gateways.
Cognitive radio (CR) is widely recognized as a spectrum sharing technique between the unlicensed users and the licensed users [13] - [18] . It can improve the arriving rates of gateways. However, there are some problems need to be solved in the process of actual application, such as interference problem. Especially, it is more obvious when the electric power communication networks are installed densely in a fixed area within the coverage of primary network base station (PBS).
In this paper, we consider the cross-tier interference between the primary network and the electric power communication networks, as well as the co-tier interference among electric power communication networks. The electric comAccording to the aforementioned framework, for a given time slot, we consider the uplink transmission in the primary network and the downlink transmission in the electric power communication network. The electric power communication networks are assumed to be installed densely in a fixed area, and a PUE is located between the fixed area and the edge of the coverage area of primary network. As shown in Fig. 1 , the gateway i receives the information from the DAU i, and the channels are assumed to be block-fading. The instantaneous fading channel gains in each block are denoted as follows: h ii is the channel gain between DAU i and gateway i, h ij is the channel gain from DAU i to gateway j, h 0i is the channel gain between PUE 0 and gateway i, g i0 is the channel gain between DAU i and PBS, and g 0 is the channel gain between PUE 0 and PBS. All the channel gains are assumed to be independent and identically distributed. The additive noises at the gateways and PBS are assumed to be independent circularly symmetric complex Gaussian with zero mean and variance σ 2 .
III. COSTS MODEL OF THE UTILITY COMPANY
In smart grid, demand response is based on the two-way communications between the utility company and the consumers, as shown in Fig. 2 . The DAU collects the meter readings from the consumers in the uplink transmission and forwards the control signals to the utility company. Meanwhile, the utility company publishes the control commands, the DAU receives and forwards the control commands from the utility company to the consumers in the downlink transmission. Zheng et al. [12] denoted that the errors in following the reference signal are significant when the packets loss are concentrated in a dense area. The packets loss increase the errors and consequently the utility company needs to purchase more automatic generation control (AGC) service in [10] - [12] . The cost of the AGC service corresponding to each gateway i is defined as
where p a is the price per unit fraction of AGC service. Z o denotes the cost from purchasing more energy over the limit of the AGC service when the power lines overload. Since the overload is random and unknown, the cost cannot be calculated directly based on the electricity price, and it is also unrelated to the packets loss rate. It was demonstrated in [11] , [12] , and [20] that the purchase of regulation service i = h(P r ) is increased with the packets loss rate P r . Therefore, the cost of the utility company can be reduced by reducing the packets loss.
We assume the packets loss rate is P r = 5% and obtain the tracking error distribution of the load control strategy in [21] from the Matlab and EasyFit software [22] , from which the tracking errors follow the normal distribution. Suppose that the probability of providing ancillary service requirement is larger than 99%, and the inequality P(µ − 3σ ≤ x ≤ µ + 3σ ) ≥ 99% holds under the normal distribution. In that case, the utility company needs to purchase µ + 3σ AGC service.
Thus, the payoff of the utility company is given by
where µ is the expectation, σ is the standard variance, and p a is the price per unit fraction of AGC service. By using the MATLAB and Easyfit software and changing the parket loss rate P r from 1%, 2% to 10%, we obtain
and
The packets loss rate can be formulated as
where T in and R i are the arriving rates of the DAU and the gateway i, respectively, and g is the probability of correct transmission from the DAUs to the gateways. As shown in (5), the packets loss rate P r is decreased with the rate of gateway i.
IV. PROBLEM FORMULATION
In this section, in order to guarantee the PUE's QoS, we first establish the interference model. Then a scheme is presented to reduce the interference of inter-electric power communication networks.
As discussed in section II, the QoS of primary network should be satisfied firstly. To guarantee the PUE's QoS, the cross-tier interferences which come from gateways should be constrained in the uplink transmission. We assume that the Q is the IT of the PBS, which represents the maximum interference tolerance from gateways in the uplink transmission of two-tier communication networks. Then, in order to meet the IT Q, the transmission power of gateways should be controlled. Moreover, the transmission quality of the PUE should be guaranteed in two-tier communication networks. The transmission quality of PUE is denoted by the target SINR. Then, we should adjust the transmission power to meet the target SINR of the PUE. However, we also need to consider the transmission quality of the gateways. Then, in order to undertake the low interference to the PBS as well as to other gateways, the transmission power of the gateways must be discreetly controlled.
Stackelberg game is a leader-follower strategic game [23] . The leader has a priority to move, while the followers can select their strategies after the leader moving. In another word, the leader considers the behavior of follower before their moving, but the followers cannot anticipate the leader's move. And under the condition of leader decision, the followers make their decisions. In the system model, we consider that the PBS is leader and gateways are followers. In the Stackelberg game, the PBS set an IT which guarantees the target SINR of the PUE, the gateways update their power to minimize the costs and reduce the interference among gateways under the IT. It means that the gateways need to VOLUME 6, 2018 control the cross-tier interference in priority and then reduce the co-tier interference.
In the above game model, the objective of the PBS is to maximize its revenue by setting a reasonable IT. In practice, the PBS should take into account its own QoS in priority and tend to set a smaller IT. For the gateways, the objective is to minimize their own costs and a larger IT is preferred. Thus, we need to make a tradeoff between the two objectives. To protect the PUE, we guarantee a minimum QoS for the PUE by penalizing the PBS's utility when the PUE's target SINR is not satisfied. We also make the gateways minimize their costs without introducing too much interference to both PBSs and other gateways.
In our formulation, the primary network and electric power communication networks coexist and share the spectrum. Thus, the transmission quality of the PUE should be satisfied. As shown in Fig. 1 , the target SINR of PUE 0 can be denoted as
where p 0 denotes the uplink transmission power of PUE 0 , Q denotes the IT, which represents the maximum interference that the PBS can tolerate. σ 2 denotes the additional white gaussian noise. τ 0 is the minimum transmission requirement of PUE 0 . Therefore, we can get the instantaneous SINR:
where p i denotes the transmission power of gateway i, Then, we have
To guarantee the transmission quality of PUE 0 , we can get τ 0 ≥ 0 . Then, the inequality that Q ≥ N i=1 p i g i0 should be satisfied. Thus, we can define the performance function of the PBS as follows:
where P is a vector of power allocation for all gateways, and it can be expressed as
The total interference of all gateways to PBS is The performance function of PBS not only guarantees the IT, but also punishes the gateways that cause interference to it. Moreover, the degrees of punishment are different under different conditions. The punishment is slight when the total interference of gateways to PBS is less than the IT, i.e., I 0 ≤ Q. Because the interference is acceptable and the objective is to get an optimal solution. However, the punishment is significant when the total interference of gateways to PBS is larger than the IT, i.e., I 0 > Q. Since the interference of gateways to PBS is very large, we should punish PBS and force gateways to adjust their powers to satisfy the transmission requirement.
Since we need to set an optimal IT Q to maximize the performance of PBS,we can obtain an optimization problem as follows:
Problem 1:
At the gateways' side, the received SINR of gateway i at DAU i is
where p −i is a vector of power allocation for all gateways except gateway i, i.e.,
Here, we also assume that the background noise at the DAUs and the PBS are same. Considering the IT Q of PBS, the equation (8) can transformed to
where I i (p −i ) is the interference from other gateways to gate-
Consequently, the transmission rate of gateway i can be expressed as
where w i is the bandwidth of gateway i. When the gateway i's SINR is typically larger than 1, the transmission rate of gateway i can be approximate to
Since the gateways are installed in a dense area, the interference among gateways is serious. The total cost functions of the gateways are coupled due to the mutual interference. However, the objective is to obtain an optimal power control solution and a minimum cost. Then, the cost minimization problem can be defined as Problem 2:
The problem 1 and problem 2 form a Stackelberg game together. The objective of the game is to achieve a Stackelberg Equilibrium (SE) point where the leader and the followers are unwilling to change. The game analysis and the game equilibrium will be introduced in the following section.
V. GAME ANALYSIS
In this section, the existence and uniqueness of the game equilibrium are investigated.
A. THE SOLUTION OF THE GAME
Based on the utility function and game analysis, we use the backward induction method to obtain the equilibrium solution.
1) THE OPTIMAL STRATEGIES OF GATEWAYS
Since we consider a two-tier communication network installed densely sharing the spectrum resource, in which the inter-cell and cross-tier interference are serious. Given the IT Q of the PBS, all gateways in the electric power communication network compete with each other to minimize their own costs by selecting their transmission powers in a fixed area. This forms a non-cooperative power control game (NPG),
where N is the set of players (all active gateways), P i and Z i (·) represent the strategy space and the cost function of gateway i. We also know that the solution of the non-cooperative game is unique. However, the solution of the problem 2 is not efficient and far from the socially optimal solution. Because in the non-cooperative power control game, all gateways selfishly minimize their own costs and transmit at the maximum power. It has been proved that one fundamental reason of the problem is lack of punishment measurement. We assume that the gateway i should be punished because of its interference to other gateways. In order to reduce the interference of gateway i to other gateways and minimize the cost of gateway i, a cost should be paid for other gateways [24] . Thus, two indicators which are the cost of gateways and the interference cost it generates should be considered. And we can obtain the cost function of gateway i:
where η j is positive and represents gateway j's marginal increase in utility per unit decrease in the total interference, i.e., η j = −
, and
And it is also called the price which gateway i receive from other gateway j. The cost function denotes the total punishment of gateway from all the other gateways because of its interference to other gateways. The channel gain h ij represents the weight of interference from gateway i to gateway j. The larger the weight is, the more severe the interference is. Furthermore, the objective of gateway i is to minimize its cost and reduce its payment to other gateways. Thus, we have the following optimization problem:
Problem 3:
We observe that the problem 3 is a convex optimization problem, which can be solved by KKT condition. Observing the objective function of problem 3, we know the gateway i updates its transmit power by the prices from other gateways and reduce its costs selfishly. However, the situation is not efficient in a dense electric power communication network. Since no penalty is given for gateway i, each gateway may announce a price large enough to force other gateways to transmit at the minimum power p min i [24] . To achieve a desirable outcome, we turn to a fictitious power-price game with interference compensation (FPPGC). (18) where FW and FC are the players sets, which both include N players. FW is a fictitious power player set, and each player i ∈ FW chooses a power p i from its strategy set P FW i and minimize its cost
where
. FC is a fictitious price player set, and each player i ∈ FC chooses a price η i from its strategy set P FC i and minimize its cost
, and η i denotes the upper bound of the price −
In G FPPGC , each gateway in the electric power communication network is splited into two fictitious players, which control power p i and the price η i in FW and FC, respectively. We can obtain an optimal solution by an asynchronous distributed power-price (ADPP) algorithm.
In the ADPP algorithm, each player announces a price η i , and all players update their powers based on the received prices. The updating of power and price is asynchronous and the time instances of the power and price of gateway i are T ip and T iη , respectively. Then, the gateway i updates its power by
Taking the first-order partial derivative of Z FW i with respect to p i , we have
Let the first-order partial derivative equal to 0, i.e.,
= 0. Therefore, we can obtain the power update function:
where [x] b a denotes min{max{x, a}, b}, i.e., if x < a, then
And at each t ∈ T ip , the gateway i updates its power by
We also obtain the price update function from equation (18):
And at each t ∈ T iη , the gateway i updates its power according to
2) THE CONVERGENCE OF ADPP
A formal definition of a supermodular game is given in [25] , [26] :
with parameter ε is said to be supermodular, if
The significance of the characteristic denotes that there is a fixed point in the supermodular game and the point is a Nash equilibrium. According to the definition 1, we have
with which, the game is a supermodular game. It has been proved in [27] that the NE set of a supermodular game is nonempty and there is a largest element and a smallest element in the NE set. Furthermore, we let E denote the NE set, and the largest element and the smallest elemet of E is p L and p S , respectively. 
According to the definition of NE, since p S is a NE of FPPGC, we have
Considering the inequality (28) and (29) together, we obtain
According to [25] , the ADPP algorithm can converge to an optimal NE solution which is pareto-optimal equilibrium.
3) THE OPTIMAL SOLUTION OF PBS
In the Stackelberg game, the objective of the PBS is to maximize its performance based on the problem 1. From the gateways' power control subgame, we can obtain the power allocation results of all gateways and achieve the optimal strategy Q * for the leader (PBS). On the other hand, the leader's optimal strategy also affects the decisions of all followers (gateways). Given the performance function of PBS in (6), we can achieve the best response as follows. When the total interference of all gateways to PBS I 0 (p) exceeds the IT Q, i.e., I 0 (p) > Q, the interference is serious and the PBS should be punished severely. The performance function of PBS is denoted as
Taking first-order partial derivative of the utility function with respect to Q, we have
Thus, U 0 (I 0 (p)) ≥ U 0 (Q) and the performance function is a monotonically increasing function. Furthermore, the performance is maximum if Q * = Q 0 . When the total interference of all gateways to PBS I 0 (p) is less than the IT Q, i.e., I 0 (p) ≤ Q, the interference not is serious and the PBS should be punished slightly. The performance function of the PBS becomes
Taking the first-order partial derivative of the performance function with respect to Q, we obtain
According to the equation (35), we know that the performance function is an increasing function if 0 ≤ Q ≤ 
In conclusion, the optimal IT of PBS is denoted as
4) DISTRIBUTED POWER CONTROL ALGORITHM
According to the above analysis, we propose the following algorithm to achieve power allocation in two-tier communication networks. Firstly, the PBS sets the interference threshold Q 0 and its pricing parameters λ 1 and λ 2 . The PBS also measures the channel gain g 0 to PUE 0 and calcualte the desired SINR τ 0 of PUE 0 . Furthermore, for any gateway i, the PBS measures its channel gain g i . The transmission power of all gateways is initialized. And other information from gateway i such as h ii , h 0i and h ij are also collected through the backhaul links. Secondly, the PBS calculate the IT Q * by (36), and then feeds Q * , g 0 , and 0 back to DAUs through the backhaul links. Finally, the gateways update their powers and prices according to the channel gain and the interference. To illustrate the process, we propose a distributed power control algorithm in Table 1 . In Table 1 , some initial values should be given, such as the IT Q, the pricing parameters λ 1 and λ 2 , 0 , g i , T 1 , T 2 . We first calculate the interference threshold Q of the PBS, and then update the powers of all gateways and the prices of all gateways until convergence to a fixed point under the condition of the IT Q. Thus, we obtain an optimal IT Q * and the optimal power allocation of all the gateways after several iterations.
5) A MODIFIED DISTRIBUTED POWER CONTROL METHOD
Although the above proposed method is optimal and convergent, the solution has some space to be improved. Because we can achieve a convergent result when I * 0 (p) ≥ Q * . The optimal IT of the PBS is Q 0 , and the optimal power allocation strategy of all gateways are p. However, the cross-tier interference I * 0 (p) from gateways to PBS exceeded the maximum tolerable interference threshold Q 0 . Thus, we should reduce the cross-tier interference when the above situation exists.
To solve this problem, we need to increase the strength of punishing the gateways. The modified cost function of gateway i becomes
where a i p i denotes the interference punishment because of gateway i's interference to PBS. Observing the utility function of gateway i, we know that the objective of gateway i is to minimize its cost and interference to other gateways and PBS. Thus, the cross-tier and co-tier interference can be reduced simultaneously. Furthermore, the parameter a i is a variable. If I 0 (p) ≤ Q, we can set a i = 1. But if I 0 (p) > Q, we can set a i = 2M until I 0 (p) ≤ Q appears, where M = {1, 2, 3, 4, . . . , N }. Then we can formulate the following optimization problem: Problem 4:
We observe that the problem 4 is similar to the problem 3. Thus, the problem 4 can be solved by the similar method of problem 3. And we can obtain the power update of gateway i:
and the price update of gateway i:
From the equation (39) and (40), the optimal solution of problem 4 can be obtained. Furthermore, the cross-tier and co-tier interference can be controlled efficiently. Next, we give some simulation results to illustrate the effectiveness of the above method.
VI. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, we will show some numerical results to demonstrate the performance of the proposed interference management scheme. We use MATLAB 7.4.0 (MathWorks, Natick, MA) as the simulation tool. As we know, the electric power communication networks can be installed by the utility companies randomly. Thus, we consider the case that the gateways can be deployed arbitrarily in the coverage of the primary network. We assume that the gateways are distributed densely within an fixed area of the primary network, and the radius of the primary network is 600m. The PBS is located at (0, 0), and the PUE 0 is located at (500,0), which is near to the electric power communication networks. Furthermore, the mutual interference among gateways cannot be neglected. We assume that the noise power σ 2 is 10 −10 W. The target SINR of PUE 0 is set to be 5dB. The arriving rates of the DAU are 0.8Mbit/s, i.e., T in = 0.8Mbit/s, The probability of correct transmission from the DAU to gateways is g = 0.8, and the base price of the AGC service p a is 20$/MW. The cost from purchasing more energy over the limit of the AGC service is $10000. Without loss of generality, we consider 6 gateways that are randomly distributed in the fixed area. The basic parameters are summarized in Table 2 .
A. THE CONVERGENCE OF THE ADPP ALGORITHM
Firstly, we consider the convergence of the ADPP algorithm and study the convergence of the powers and prices for all gateways and the interference threshold of the PBS in the following. We use the logarithmic coordinates in Figs. 3-5 . It can be observed that the powers and prices of all gateways and the IT of the PBS converge to the optimum in five iterations. Moreover, the optimal interference threshold becomes larger with the iterations. The equilibrium point of the IT is less than the maximum tolerance IT and the results are effective. 
B. THE COMPARISON OF TWO POWER CONTROL METHODS
To illustrate the effectiveness of the cross-tier interference management for the proposed scheme, we compare the distributed power control method with the modified distributed power control method. We also consider two performance indexes, i.e., the interference threshold Q and the crosstier total interference I 0 from gateways to PBS. The modified distributed power control method is better than the distributed power control method. Comparing these tw figures, we observe that the cross-tier total interference is larger than the interference threshold when the maximum tolerable IT becomes small with iterations in the power control with NLP. The optimal IT with high Q 0 is larger than the IT with low Q 0 .
The variations of the interference threshold Q and the cross-tier total interference I 0 with iterations are shown in Fig. 6 and Fig. 7 under different maximum tolerable IT Q 0 , respectively. The LP denotes the link protection, which is used in the modified distributed power control scheme. The NLP denotes no link protection, which is the distributed power control scheme. As shown in Fig. 6 and Fig. 7 , the performance with LP is better than that with NLP. Furthermore, the interference threshold Q is always larger than the cross-tier total interference I 0 in LP. However, the interference threshold is larger than cross-tier total interference in the beginning, and the interference threshold is smaller than cross-tier total interference after a few iterations. Because the tolerable total interference of the PBS becomes smaller when Q 0 decreases. And it is the reason that we employ the modified distributed power control scheme.
C. THE PERFORMANCE OF THE GATEWAYS
To demonstrate the proposed method, we will study the performance of the gateways in a different case when different number of gateways are installed in a fixed area.
In Fig. 8 and Fig. 9 , we consider the influence of the number of gateways on the cost of the utility company and the packets loss rate with different target SINR of PUE 0 and maximum tolerance IT Q 0 . As shown in Fig. 8 and Fig. 9 , we observe that the cost of the utility company and the packets loss rate increase gradually with the number of gateways, because the interference among gateways increases. We also observe that the cost of the utility company and the packets loss rate are larger at first and becomes smaller with the increase of maximum tolerable interference under the same target SINR of PUE 0 r 0 . The reason is that the cross-tier interference is reduced at the expense of the cost of the electric power communication networks. Furthermore, the cost of the utility company with high r 0 is smaller than that with low r 0 under the same maximum tolerable IT.
In Fig. 10 , we consider the SINR of gateways in different schemes. ''DPCM'' denotes the proposed distributed power control scheme, ''SGNP'' denotes the scheme in [25] , and ''CIT'' denotes the scheme when the interference threshold is constant in the fictitious power-price game. It is easy to observe that the SINR of the gateways in the proposed scheme is superior to the other schemes. It is noted that the SGNP can reduce cross-tier interference significantly, however the interference among gateways cannot be reduced effectively. Thus, the SINR of gateways is low.
D. THE PERFORMANCE OF THE PBS
The performance of the PBS is studied with different parameters in the two-tier communication network, such as the target SINR of PUE 0 and the maximum tolerable interference threshold.
As shown in Fig. 11 , we consider the change of the PBS's performance with the PUE 0 's target SINR. For convenience, the PBS's performance in the Fig. 11 is converted to negative logarithm when the PBS's performance is less than zero. ''DPC'' denotes the distributed power control method, ''MDPC'' denotes the modified distributed power control method. As shown in Fig. 11 , the performance of the PBS becomes negative when the PUE 0 's target SINR is larger than 7dB in DPC. It is coincident with the fact that the PBS is punished seriously when the target SINR cannot be satisfied and the cross-tier interference is large. However, the PBS's performance tends to be stable when the MDPC is employed. Thus, the cross-tier interference can be reduced significantly and the QoS of the primary network can be guaranteed.
In Fig. 12 , we consider the influence of the maximum tolerable interference threshold on the PBS's performance. We compare the optimal interference threshold Q of the PBS with the interference I 0 to the PBS in different schemes. In the DPC scheme, Q and I 0 increase with Q 0 up to the equilibrium. However, Q is less than I 0 when the maximum tolerable interference is less than a certain value. Because the crosstier interference increases when Q 0 becomes small. And the primary link is lack of protecting. In the MDPC scheme, the above problem can be solved and the I 0 is always less than Q.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we study the two-tier communication interference management problem when the electric power communication networks are densely deployed. We propose a distributed power control method which can reduce the co-tier interference among electric power communication networks and guarantee the PUEs' QoS. The objective is to minimize the cost of the utility company. To guarantee the PUEs' QoS, a reasonable IT is chosen by punishing electric power communication networks because of its crosstier interference to PBS. To control the co-tier interference, a fictitious power-price game with compensation is applied with the optimal IT. A modified distributed power control method is also proposed to protect the primary link and control the interference.
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